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Abstract 
The paper investigates and tests the hypothesis that the intelligent and educated people are 
honest taxpayer citizens. In order to validate this hypothesis, the empirical part follows a 
cross-sectional approach, with OLS and robust estimations, across 55 countries. Considering 
the IQ as main proxy for human intelligence, the obtained results do not allow us to validate 
this hypothesis. 
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Introduction  
 
In the last decades, the human capital became a usual determinant of tax revenues for many 
researchers who work in the field of taxation. Unfortunately, the human intelligence, as one of 
the most important valences of human capital, has been completely neglected in the tax area 
investigations. 
The paper investigates the impact of human intelligence on tax revenues, by following a 
cross-sectional model approach, with 55 countries, from different continents. The countries 
have different degrees of economic development and type of social systems. The main 
hypothesis assumes that the human intelligence have a significant impact on tax revenues. 
A priori, there are many arguments in favour of the existence of connection between tax 
revenues and level of human intelligence.  
First group of arguments reveal a positive impact of intelligence on tax inputs. The main idea 
is that the instructed persons have an accentuate tendency to be honest citizens, registering a 
high level of tax compliance (Dee, 2004; Milligan et al., 2004; Reynal-Querol and Besley, 
2011). The same instructed persons take a lot of advantages in respect to public goods and 
financial transfers receiving. As feed-back, such benefits additionally improve the taxpayer’s 
compliance. On the other hand, these types of connections can also reveal a transitory 
transmission channel, as the human capital affects the quality of institutions and, as 
consequence, the level of collected tax revenues (Kodila-Tedika, 2013, 2014; Lynn and 
Vanhanen, 2012; Kalonda-Kanyama and Kodila-Tedika, 2012; Botero et al., 2012; Potrafke, 
2012; Rindermann, 2012). In this case, high intelligence quotient ensures the best institutional 
quality, which is assimilated to high level of tax compliance. 
Second group of works show a negative correlation between tax revenues and human 
intelligence. In fact, if the theory of rationality is viewed in extreme sense, we can expect the 
“free rider” behaviour to intelligent persons. In this way, we should accept the idea of large 
temporal horizon of Potrafke (2012), de Jones (2011), and Jones and Podemska (2010). If this 
hypothesis is accepted, we can consider that the intelligent persons internalize the tax costs 
through the free rider behaviour. 
Even if we follow the positive or negative direction of “tax revenues - human intelligence” 
nexus, it is clear that the persons with high intelligence quotient are the taxpayers who can 
very easy influence the tax collections, based on their cognitive capacity. Moreover, these 
persons do not have a superior morality in respect to the registered level in the whole society. 
There are many studies which demonstrate a positive relationship between intelligence and 
atheism (Lynn et al., 2009; Kanazawa, 2009; Reeve, 2009)
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The study offers several contributions to the literature in the field. Firstly, it is one of the first 
investigations which consider the human intelligence as main determinants of tax revenue. 
Secondly, the empirical part follows the M-estimators of Huber (1973) and MM-estimator 
proposed by Yohai (1987). S-estimator introduced by Rousseeuw and Yohai (1984) is also 
used, by following the fast algorithm proposed by Salibian-Barrera and Yohai (2006). 
Thirdly, the paper develops the taxation research area, proposing a new tax determinant: the 
human intelligence.  
The paper is organized in fourth sections, including this introduction. The empirical model 
and data are discussed and presented in Section 2. The empirical results are showed and 
analysed in Section 3, while the Section 4 concludes.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 We consider that the religion is associated with a high level of morality. The works of Barro and McCleary 
(2003), and McCleary and Barro (2006) have the same motivation, especially for testing the Weber’s hypothesis.  
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Empirical approach and data 
 
In order to investigate the connection between tax revenues and intelligence, we estimate the 
following basic empirical model: 
 
                         (1) 
 
where τ is the tax ratio (tax revenues as percentage of GDP), IQ denotes the intelligence 
quotient, i=1,2... captures the country index, Z = (z1,… zk) is the vector of control variables, 
while i represents the error term that is assumed to be normally and independently 
distributed. 0 is the intercept, 1 captures the effect of IQ and =(1, 2,.. n) is the parameter 
vector for “n” control variables. The model is estimated by using the ordinary least squares 
(OLS). Furthermore, our empirical approach follows the M-estimators of Huber (1973) by 
using iteratively reweighted least squares (IRWLS) and MM-estimator proposed by Yohai 
(1987). S-estimator introduced by Rousseeuw and Yohai (1984) is also used, by following the 
fast algorithm proposed by Salibian-Barrera and Yohai (2006). Comparatively with OLS 
approach, the advantage of these robust estimators is that they fix simultaneously any issue 
arises from the existence of outliers and/or heteroskedasticity (non-constant error variances), 
as Midi and Talib (2008) note. 
The tax ratio is the dependent variable and represents the volume of tax revenues as 
percentage of GDP. The variable is obtained from World Bank online database, being 
regularly used as dependent variable in many studies, such as: Ghura (1998), Piancastelli 
(2001), Tanzi (1981), Leuthold, (1991), Stotsky and WoldeMariam (1997), Bird et al. (2006), 
and Kodila-Tedika and Mutascu (2014). 
IQ is the interest variable and illustrates the mean intelligence quotient of the general 
population. We used this measure as main proxy for human intelligence. Gouillon (2002) 
affirms that IQ is the tool more used in psychometry. It allows inform simple to quantify a 
great number of cognitive capacities of the subject and her general intelligence (the factor G). 
Psychologists regularly resort to it (Neisser, 1998; Larivée and Gagné, 2006). The data on IQ 
comes from Lynn et al. (2002, 2006 and 2010). We also note that this variable is regularly 
used in many studies, such as: Kodila-Tedika (2013a, 2012), Lynn and Vanhanen (2012), 
Kalonda-Kanyama and Kodila-Tedika (2012), and Potrafke (2012). 
In order to isolate the effect of interest variable, we entered a set of control variables, which 
include: per capita GDP (log), share of agriculture sector as percentage of GDP, and share of 
imports as percentage of GDP, according to Gupta (2007). These data are taken from World 
Bank. Finally, for robustness, we also include two other determinants: shadow economy and 
government effectiveness. 
GDP per capita is a traditional indicator of economic development. Thus, it is expected that 
this indicator has a certain positive significant correlation with the tax performance. This 
hypothesis is plausible especially in virtue of the Wagner’s law. The sectorial composition 
also is an important element of taxation. In Africa, for example, the agricultural sector 
consists of agriculture substance, but the mining sector may be useful to generate significant 
tax revenues to the economy if these areas attract large companies. Chelliah (1971) identifies 
as explanatory variables for the tax share: the mining share, the non-mineral exploitation and 
the agriculture share.  
If the mining share has a positive impact on tax revenues, the agricultural share has a negative 
one. At the same time, many studies emphasize the role of openness on the income tax (e.g. 
Keen and Simone, 2004; and Rodrik, 1998). The per capita income and trade share are 
significant determinants of the tax share (Piancastelli, 2001; Chelliahet al., 1975; Tait et al., 
1979). Tanzi (1992) states that half of the tax ration variation is explained by per capita 
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income, import share, agriculture share and foreign debt share. The import share is positively 
correlated with the tax ratio. 
The shadow economy is being estimated by following the DYMIMIC approach. It measures 
the level of informal economy as percentage of GDP. The sources of data are the studies of 
Schneider (2005b), with theoretical base in Schneider (2005a, 2005b). This variable is 
regularly used as dependent variable in many studies, such as: Schneider (2005a), Mazhar and 
Méon (2012), and Kodila-Tedika and Mutascu (2014). 
Finally, the measure of institutional quality is captured by Government Effectiveness and 
comes from the dataset compile by Daniel Kaufmann, Art Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi at 
the World Bank. This sample aggregates indicators of six broad dimensions of governance: 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory 
Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. These six aggregate indicators are based on 
30 underlying data sources reporting the perceptions of governance of a large number of 
survey respondents and expert assessments worldwide.  
Several studies focus on the importance of institutional factors in determining of tax 
performance. For example, Bird et al. (2006) find factors, such as: corruption, rule of law, and 
regulations. Corruption, voice and accountability also determine a positive significant impact 
on tax effort (Bird et al. 2008). On the same note, Besley and Person (2013) put in evidence 
the positive role of institutional quality in tax revenues collection.  
For robustness, we entered two dummy variables: one continental and another one 
organizational. In the first case, following the trend in the literature, geographical location is 
captured by distinguishing between the Africa, Asia, Oceania, Europa and America. If the 
country belongs to the African continent, the continental dummy has the score 1 otherwise 0. 
This logic was also applied to all other continents. In the second case, the organizational 
dummy variable captures the country membership to OECD (value is 1 for OECD country 
and 0 otherwise).  
Finally, the school variable of Barro and Lee (1996) is used to perform the mix variable “IQ x 
School”, in order to capture the effect of IQ under school impact. The school variable denotes 
the average years of schooling for population aged 15 and over. 
Table 1 below provides a summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis. 
 
Table 1 - Summary statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tax revenue  16.966     7.6343    .175    46.186 
IQ 90.622 10.900 60         108 
Log GDP per capita 8.871     1.188    5.903 11.173 
Agriculture share   12.063 13.031 0 67.008 
Import share 50.020 29.360 11.52    200.273 
Government effectiveness .113     .993   -1.751 2.217 
OECD .2117     .450           0 1 
Shadow economy 32.342 13.126 8.5        65.1 
School 7.212     2.879       .892 13.004 
 
The regressors are available for the following countries: Armenia, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, 
Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Germany, Ghana, Hong Kong, Croatia, 
Hungary, Indonesia, India, Ireland, Iran, Iceland, Italy, Jordan, Japan, Kenya, Lithuania, 
Malta, Malaysia, Namibia, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, 
Ukraine, Uruguay, United States, Venezuela, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.  
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Results  
 
The first results, based on the OLS estimators, by following the White’s (1980) 
heteroskedasticity correction, are presented in Table 2. The interest variable IQ is 
significant and negatively correlated with dependent variable only in the case of models 
without “IQ x School” variable.  
 
Table 2 - Main regressions (cross-sectional OLS) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IQ -.356 
(0.000) 
-.344 
(0.007) 
.273 
(0.416) 
.421 
(0.176) 
Agriculture  share -.176 
(0.343) 
-.116 
(0.587) 
-.114 
(0.487) 
-.080 
(0.673) 
Import share  -.0012 
(0.985) 
.009 
(0.754) 
-.004 
(0.868) 
.006 
(0.814) 
Government 
effectiveness 
4.900 
(0.002) 
4.415 
(0.006) 
5.310 
(0.001) 
4.651 
(0.002) 
OECD 1.749 
(0.346) 
-.840 
(0.684) 
2.571 
(0.209) 
.220 
(0.919) 
Shadow economy .165 
(0.028 ) 
.106 
(0.079) 
.152 
(0.025) 
.093 
(0.093) 
Log(GDPcap2005)   .083 
(0.977) 
.601 
(0.850) 
-.221 
(0.935) 
.163 
(0.954) 
School .149 
(0.732) 
-.420 
(0.278) 
8.337 
(0.048) 
8.781 
(0.023) 
IQ*School   -.089 
(0.057) 
-.099 
(0.017) 
Dummy continental No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.3967 0.5708 0.4315 0.6086 
Obs. 55 55 55 55 
All regressions are estimated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction. All regressions include 
constant. P-values are in parentheses. 
 
On the other hand, only two control variables are significant in all scenarios, heaving positive 
sign (i.e. government effectiveness and shadow economy). The rest of control determinants 
are not significant, excepting the school and “IQ x School” variables in the models with “IQ x 
School”. 
In order to test the sensitivity, we follow different robust estimators, by using the same 
regressors and taking into account two sequences: without “IQ x School” variable, and with 
“IQ x School” variable (Table 3 and 4 respectively). The estimations are employed based on 
the M-estimators of Huber (1973), MM-estimator proposed by Yohai (1987), and S-estimator 
introduced by Rousseeuw and Yohai (1984), with the fast algorithm of Salibian-Barrera and 
Yohai (2006).  
 
Table 3 - Main regressions taking into account the sensitivity (“without IQ x School”) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IQ -.365 
(0.014) 
-.292 
(0.059) 
-.362 
(0.000) 
-.323 
(0.003) 
-.353 
(0.001) 
-.270 
(0.040) 
-.220 
(0.001) 
-.102 
(0.601) 
Agricultureshare -.140 
(0.491) 
.057 
(0.746) 
-.151 
(0.550) 
-.0515 
(0.820) 
.101 
(0.598) 
.142 
(0.387) 
.529 
(0.000) 
.458 
(0.091) 
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Import share  -.009 
(0.776) 
-.009 
(0.767) 
-.009 
(0.805) 
.00116 
(0.965) 
-.048 
(0.006) 
-.0163 
(0.343) 
-.0410 
(0.000) 
-.005 
(0.818) 
Government 
effectiveness 
4.608 
(0.024) 
4.019 
(0.020) 
4.795 
(0.001) 
4.289 
(0.002) 
4.117 
(0.023) 
3.735 
(0.013) 
.883 
(0.130) 
2.002 
(0.334) 
OECD 1.772 
(0.520) 
-1.502 
(0.541) 
1.672 
(0.338) 
-1.079 
(0.550) 
1.5425 
(0.374) 
-1.658 
(0.369) 
2.159 
(0.064) 
1.394 
(0.510) 
Shadow economy .155 
(0.117) 
.1272 
(0.152) 
.159 
(0.026) 
.114 
(0.037) 
.14349 
(0.027) 
.136 
(0.011) 
.137 
(0.005) 
.154 
(0.511) 
Log(GDPcap2005)     .713 
(0.809) 
2.841 
(0.255) 
.556 
(0.876) 
1.486803 
(0.654) 
3.839 
(0.164) 
3.980 
(0.100) 
8.628 
(0.000) 
6.015 
(0.138) 
School .234 
(0.628) 
-.5023 
(0.250) 
.214 
(0.604) 
-.450 
(0.185) 
.37652 
(0.219) 
-.543 
(0.119) 
.246 
(0.121) 
-.531 
(0.270) 
Dummy 
continental 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Obs. 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
Method Hubert 
 
Hubert 
 
M-
estimator 
M-
estimator 
MM-
estimators 
MM-
estimators 
S-
estimator 
S-
estimator 
All regressions include constant. P-values are in parentheses. 
 
Table 4 - Main regressions taking into account the sensitivity (“with IQ x School”) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IQ .272 
(0.534) 
.424 
(0.310) 
-.243 
(0.068) 
.411 
(0.111) 
.273 
(0.438) 
.420 
(0.115) 
-.201 
(0.778) 
.413 
(0.075) 
Agricultureshare -.112 
(0.579) 
.052 
(0.756) 
.525 
(0.000) 
.303 
(0.029) 
-.122 
(0.416) 
-.018 
(0.931) 
.092 
(0.785) 
.150 
(0.172) 
Import share  -.005 
(0.885) 
-.007 
(0.809) 
-.041 
(0.000) 
.002 
(0.909) 
-.003752 
(0.882) 
.000 
(0.989) 
-.042 
(0.427) 
-.016 
(0.327) 
Government 
effectiveness 
5.069 
(0.012) 
4.121 
(0.013) 
.874 
(0.137) 
1.935 
(0.155) 
5.294 
(0.000) 
4.359 
(0.000) 
4.231 
(0.028) 
3.793 
(0.005) 
OECD 2.747 
(0.319) 
-.364 
(0.879) 
2.215 
(0.048) 
.622 
(0.773) 
2.656 
(0.162) 
.031 
(0.988) 
1.698 
(0.382) 
-.740 
(0.665) 
Shadow economy .155 
(0.109) 
.106 
(0.208) 
.137 
(0.004) 
.114 
(0.091) 
.157 
(0.016) 
.097 
(0.068) 
.147 
(0.022) 
.117 
(0.009) 
Log(GDPcap2005)     .049 
(0.986) 
2.025 
(0.395) 
8.591 
(0.000) 
3.946 
(0.123) 
-.126 
(0.960) 
1.055 
(0.737) 
3.581 
(0.483) 
3.444 
(0.057) 
School 8.454 
(0.123) 
8.269 
(0.084) 
-.124 
(0.940) 
6.598 
(0.048) 
8.368 
(0.044) 
8.457 
(0.013) 
2.493 
(0.808) 
7.750 
(0.004) 
IQ*School -.090 
(0.128) 
-.094 
(0.068) 
.004 
(0.820) 
-.077 
(0.025) 
-.089 
(0.057) 
-.096 
(0.008) 
-.0231 
(0.836) 
-.089 
(0.002) 
Dummy 
continental 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Obs. 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 
Method Hubert Hubert  S-
estimator 
S-
estimator 
M-
estimators 
M-
estimators 
MM-
estimators 
MM-
estimators 
All regressions include constant. P-values are in parentheses. 
 
The outputs reveal that only in the case of models “without IQ x School” the interest variable 
IQ is significant and negatively correlated with tax revenues ratio, while in the scenario “with 
IQ x School” the IQ becomes not significant. The same situation is registered for control 
variables, which are generally not conclusive. This output emphasises the idea that the IQ 
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variable, as interest determinant of tax ration, is very sensitive under different scenarios, 
especially when the IQ is “mixed” with the scholastic education.    
Thus, based on considered cases, the main results illustrate that the impact of IQ on tax 
revenues ratio is not conclusive, IQ registering different sign and significance status. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The intelligence represents one of the most significant valences of human capital, with 
complex implications in the socio-economic area. Even if there are many implications of 
intelligence on human behaviour, our empirical estimations do not put in evidence very clear 
some influence of this human dimension on tax area. For all considered scenarios and for all 
types of estimation methods, the results are contradictory (i.e. reveal opposite signs) or are not 
significant.   
Regarding the policy implications, it is clear that the intelligence cannot be taking into 
account in tax policy, the IQ not being a good predictor for public authorities’ decision-
making related to the tax revenues collections.  
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